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DEVELOPING A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
THROUGH THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Patrick G . Maroun*
This year marks the centennial of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, one of the
oldest environmental regulatory statutes in the United States . It is illegal to
“take” or “kill” any migratory bird covered by the Act . But many of the eco-
nomic and industrial assumptions that undergirded the Act in 1918 have
changed dramatically . Although it is undisputed that hunting protected birds
is prohibited, circuit courts split on whether so-called “incidental takings” fall
within the scope of the Act . The uncertainty inherent in this disagreement
harms public and private interests alike—not to mention migratory birds .
Many of the most important environmental statutes are also aging and may
soon face similar interpretive issues . This Note argues that, to address inher-
ent problems with aging environmental statutes, courts should adopt a juris-
prudential preference for fidelity to each statute’s purpose .
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“Let the song bird live to herald to the world its happy and joyous an-
them  .  .  .  . Civilization, ever advancing along the world’s pathway, pleads for
humanity, for the birds, so helpless and yet so useful .”
– Congressman Charles Manly Stedman, 19181
In 2006, CITGO Refining and Chemicals Company and its Environ-
mental Manager, Philip Vrazel, were indicted on five counts of violating the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012) (the “Act”).2 The govern-
ment alleged that CITGO’s operation of open-air petroleum tanks and Vra-
zel’s failure to alter this operational arrangement exposed migratory birds to
life-threatening danger, resulting in the deaths of dozens of protected birds.3
After a bench trial, the defendants were convicted of three counts of violat-
ing the Act, and the court fined CITGO $45,000.4 On appeal, CITGO argued
that their business operations, though resulting in the deaths of protected
birds, did not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of the Act because
their conduct was not directed at migratory birds.5 Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit ultimately reversed the district court and vacated the convictions, it
acknowledged that there was legal authority to support both the broad inter-
pretation supported by the government and the narrow interpretation urged
by CITGO.6
In May 2015, while CITGO’s appeal was pending before the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a Notice of Intent “to prepare a
programmatic environmental impact statement . . . to evaluate the potential
environmental impacts of a proposal to authorize incidental tak[ings] of mi-
gratory birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”7 A year-and-a-half later,
1. 56 CONG. REC. 7362 (1918).
2. Indictment at paras. 11, 19, 41, 48–55, United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893
F. Supp. 2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (No. C–06–563), 2006 WL 4664154; see also Superseding In-
dictment at paras. 11, 19, 41–55, United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (No. C–06–563–S), 2007 WL 2049359.
3. Indictment, supra note 2, at paras. 41–55; see also Superseding Indictment, supra
note 2, at paras. 41–55.
4. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015). CITGO
was also convicted of violation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012) and 40 C.F.R.
60.690–.699 (2018), and fined $2 million. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 478, 481.
5 . CITGO Petroleum Corp ., 801 F.3d at 488.
6 . See id . at 488–89, 494.
7. Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Notice of
Intent, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (May 26, 2015) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21); accord Memorandum
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in the waning days of the Obama Administration, the Department of the In-
terior issued a memorandum opinion that indirect takings were prohibited
under the Act.8 The memorandum criticized the Fifth Circuit’s construction
of “take” as “erroneous[].”9 With two of the five circuit court opinions on the
scope of the Act coming during the Obama Administration,10 the agency’s
guidance signaled a potential acceleration of federal prosecutions under the
Act. But it was not long lived.
Less than a month later, Acting Secretary K. Jack Haugrud ordered a
temporary suspension of the guidance, pending the Trump Administration’s
review.11 On December 22, 2017, “[i]n light of further analysis of the text,
history, and purpose of the MBTA, as well as relevant case law,” the guidance
was permanently withdrawn and replaced with new guidance finding that
the Act “appl[ies] only to affirmative actions that have as their purpose the
taking or killing of migratory birds.”12 On April 11, 2018, the new guidance
officially went into effect.13 All this happened without any substantive
change to the underlying law, and, without definitive construction of the Act
by the Supreme Court, could be reversed yet again at the political whims of
future administrations. Waffling back and forth for the foreseeable future is
unacceptable. Uncertainty in the law not only endangers migratory birds but
also inhibits government environmental agencies from carrying out their du-
ties and private businesses from carrying out their everyday activities14—
both those that have obvious global environmental impacts and those that
have less obvious environmental import.15 In short, the stakes are too high.
M-37041 from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Dir., Fish & Wildlife
Serv. 14 (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/files/2017/12/m-
37041.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TD9-YXND].
8. Tompkins, supra note 7. The memorandum opinion uses the word “direct” differ-
ently than I do in this Note. The memorandum states that only “direct” takings are prohibited
under the Act but intends this to emphasize that the government must show causation. Id . at 2
& n.6. Throughout this Note, I use “direct” and “indirect” to analyze one of the “axes” of inci-
dental takes, specifically whether conduct is directed at a migratory bird. See infra Part II.
9 . Id . at 1–2.
10 . See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
11. Memorandum from K. Jack Haugrud, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to
Acting Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/
02/21/document_ew_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4ZL-XT2B].
12. Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, to Sec’y of the Interior (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
uploads/m-37050.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MWE-33KC]; accord Darryl Fears & Dino Grandoni,
The Trump Administration Has Officially Clipped the Wings of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/
wp/2018/04/13/the-trump-administration-officially-clipped-the-wings-of-the-migratory-bird-
treaty-act/ [https://perma.cc/D82T-5CCM].
13. Fears & Grandoni, supra note 12.
14 . See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
15 . See infra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Trump Administration guidance does not preclude state
officials or the Justice Department from prosecuting incidental takings.16
Short of an amendment to the law—a task well outside Congress’s short list
of agenda items—only the Court can bring a definitive end to this conflict.
This Note argues that clarifying the proper interpretation of the Act is
an opportunity to develop a new jurisprudential framework for analyzing
environmental protection statutes. Part I discusses the Act’s background in
the American conservationist movement of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and suggests that as environmental statutes age they will
face similar interpretive issues. Part II frames incidental takings as being
composed of two axes—directness and intent. It then discusses the strengths
and weaknesses of the existing interpretations of the Act, ultimately finding a
relatively narrow interpretation most in line with the Act’s intent and pur-
pose. Part III describes the need for a new jurisprudential preference for pre-
serving the purpose of aging environmental statutes.
I. ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL BATTLES
The Act’s regulatory reach is important because it affects the conduct of
businesses and public–private partnerships. As with any conduct-regulating
law, the fundamental question is exactly what conduct the Act intends to
proscribe. To better understand the contours of this question and why it has
created such disagreement between the courts, Section I.A briefly covers the
history of the American conservation movement leading up to the Act; Sec-
tion I.B introduces the split in authority; and Section I.C discusses how the
controversy over the Act foreshadows future problems in environmental law.
A. The Advent of National Conservation and the Act
By the late nineteenth century, the American conservation movement
was gaining steam.17 As early as 1896, the Supreme Court recognized the im-
portance of protecting certain animals. In Geer v . Connecticut, the Court
found that game animals were the collective property of the public to be held
16. Jennifer A Dlouhy, Trump Administration Reverses Obama-Era Policy on Accidental
Bird Deaths, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2017, 1:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-22/trump-is-said-to-reverse-strict-obama-era-policy-on-bird-deaths-jbi84akp
[https://perma.cc/7YMJ-FY4L].
17 . See generally Bird Conservation Timeline, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated
Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/birds/about-us/timeline.php [https://perma.cc/UY3Z-
SYJJ]; Birth of a National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated June 4, 2018), https://
www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/yellowstoneestablishment.htm [https://perma.cc/
QPU2-SB7U]; Frequently Asked Questions: History, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated Mar. 30,
2018), https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/history-faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZQ27-TMDA]; THE NATIONAL PARKS: SHAPING THE SYSTEM app. (last modified Mar. 17,
2004, 7:08 PM), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/mackintosh1/sts3.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z5PC-MB5N].
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in trust by the states.18 Soon after, Congress made several attempts to protect
bird populations with national legislation.19 Yet these efforts did not go un-
impeded. They ran head-on into the demands of American westward expan-
sion, industrialization, and women’s fashion20—bird populations in the East
had already been damaged by the demands of haute couture.21 By the early
twentieth century, improved infrastructure and refrigerated railcars con-
nected hunting grounds in the western United States with urban markets in
the east, augmenting the financial incentives to hunt.22 Conservationists
seemingly won a monumental victory with the enactment of the 1913
Weeks-McLean Act,23 which “attempted . . . to regulate the killing of migra-
tory birds within the States,” but it was soon struck down by two separate
district courts in 1914 and 1915.24 Opponents of Weeks-McLean successfully
argued that “Congress had no power to displace” the “control” over game-
hunting regulations reserved to states by Geer,25 transforming Geer from a
victory into a barrier to nationwide conservation efforts.26
In response to these court decisions, Congress looked for another way to
protect migratory birds. The result was a 1916 treaty with the United King-
dom. Congress acted on its duties under the treaty by enacting a law even
more ambitious than Weeks-McLean.27 This game of legal “chicken” culmi-
nated in Holland v . Missouri.28 But this time, the Court only considered
whether Congress’s actions were valid under its treaty powers and did not
articulate the scope of the Act’s prohibitions.29
18. 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
19 . Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note 17; George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T.
Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV.
165, 168–69 (1979).
20. Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Incidental Taking Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5–6 (2013); see also Bird Conservation
Timeline, supra note 17.
21 . See Jesse Greenspan, The History and Evolution of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
AUDUBON (May 22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-evolution-migratory-bird-
treaty-act [https://perma.cc/73FF-DCC9]. By the turn of the century, Labrador Ducks and
Great Auks were extinct, but their plumage lived on, adorning the hats of well-to-do American
women. Id . Soon, Passenger Pigeons, Carolina Parakeets, and Heath Hens would suffer the
same fate. Id .
22. Ogden, supra note 20, at 5.
23. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847–48 (repealed 1918). This act was ini-
tially included in an appropriations bill but became known as the Weeks-McLean Act. Jorjani,
supra note 12, at 3.
24. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); see United States v. McCullagh, 221 F.
288, 294 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
25 . Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
26 . See id .
27 . See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id . art. VI, cl. 2; Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
28. 252 U.S. at 433.
29 . Holland, 252 U.S. at 433–35.
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Nearly sixty years later, the Western District of New York30 and the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed this question in United States v . FMC Corp .31 Over the
next four decades, four more courts of appeals have weighed in. Today, there
are three distinct interpretations of the Act.32
B. The Split and the Stakes
In the century since its enactment, the Act has significantly alleviated the
dangers to protected bird populations from hunters and poachers.33 But to-
day, protected birds are much more likely to be killed indirectly by “anthro-
pogenic threats”—aspects of modern human life that, despite their benign
purposes, have harmful effects on birds34—than by hunters or poachers.35 In
light of the changing industrial landscape and the impact of modern innova-
tions on the environment, some courts have adopted a broad construction of
the Act. This approach leans heavily on the Act’s purpose to protect birds
from the economic and environmental pressures of modern society.36 Other
courts prioritize commitment to the specific conduct the Act’s drafters
would have had in mind in 1918.37 Because the economic incentives and rel-
atively limited industrial technology of the early twentieth century induced
large-scale hunting of birds, rather than the proliferation of indirect “an-
thropogenic threats,” a focus on Congress’s intent leads to a narrower inter-
pretation of the Act.
The disposition of this question affects the advancement of industrial
projects and the degree of protection that migratory birds enjoy. A broader
construction of the Act reaches conduct with a more attenuated relationship
to birds, affording them greater protection38 but also stifling industrial de-
30. United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
31. 572 F.2d 902, 904 (2d Cir. 1978).
32. As shown in Section II.D, the courts of appeals have less disagreement among them
than the term “circuit split” implies. In large part, the courts are simply analyzing (slightly)
different parts of the text.
33. Ogden, supra note 20, at 6.
34 . Id . Ogden gives many examples, including: collisions with windows, communica-
tions towers, transmission and power lines, vehicles, and wind turbines; electrocutions; and
poisonings. Id . at 7–8.
35 . Id . at 6; see, e .g ., Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail v. Fed. Transit Admin., 255 F.
Supp. 3d 60, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2017) (involving a proposed light-rail transit system that could kill
migratory birds protected under the Act).
36 . See FMC Corp ., 572 F.2d at 907.
37 . See Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“Thus, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms ‘take’ and ‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C.
§ 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which
was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.’ “ (quoting Seattle
Audobon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)).
38. As individuals, but not necessarily long-term as species. See infra text following note
129.
February 2019] More Than Birds 795
velopment, provision of green energy,39 and even activities of government
environmental agencies.40 A narrower interpretation, however, exposes birds
that Congress intended to protect from human industry to increasing danger
and a possible relapse to the dangerously low population levels that caused
Congress to act in the first place.41 As is often the case with conflicts between
intent and purpose, the root of this problem is that many of the basic as-
sumptions underlying the Act have changed in the one hundred years since
its enactment.42
Other fundamental American environmental statutes might soon face
similar issues of construction as the Act, which was sixty years old when the
Second Circuit decided FMC Corp ., a mere five years older than the Clean
Air Act43 is today. The Clean Water Act,44 Endangered Species Act (“ESA”),45
and Federal Land Policy and Management Act46 are all between forty and fif-
ty years old. Each act proclaims environmental protection and preservation
as the broad public policy of the United States, but—just like with the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act—some of the basic assumptions underlying these laws
have shifted since the time of their enactment.
A broad or narrow interpretation of statutes like these can have a signif-
icant, and perhaps irreversible, impact on the environment. For instance, a
broad interpretation of the scope of the congressional grant of power to the
EPA under the Clean Air Act may, given our increased understanding of the
impact of greenhouse gasses, allow for effective rulemaking that can bypass
recent political deadlock.47 And while a narrow interpretation may avoid ill-
advised regulations,48 prohibiting the EPA from issuing rules designed to re-
39. The impact of the Act on green energy development is an even more critical consid-
eration, given recent developments in American trade policy. See Timothy Cama, Trump Im-
poses 30 Percent Tariff on Solar Panel Imports, HILL (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:57 PM), http://
thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/370171-trump-imposes-30-tariffs-on-solar-panel-
imports [https://perma.cc/D3A6-SPSW].
40. For example, the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy provides funding and research assistance to wind-energy development projects. Wind
Energy Technologies Office Projects Map, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/
wind/wind-energy-technologies-office-projects-map [https://perma.cc/NBC6-WLYC]. But a
study published in 2013 found that wind-energy projects caused almost 600,000 bird fatalities
each year. K. Shawn Smallwood, Comparing Bird and Bat Fatality-Rate Estimates Among North
American Wind-Energy Projects, 37 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 19, 19 (2013). A broader reading of
the Act could thus curtail the government’s well-intentioned efforts to generate renewable
wind energy.
41 . See Ogden, supra note 20, at 7.
42 . See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).
47 . See Alison Koppe, Note, Regulate, Reuse, Recycle: Repurposing the Clean Air Act to
Limit Power Plants’ Carbon Emissions, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 349, 350–52 (2014).
48 . See id . at 370–72.
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duce greenhouse gases would undercut the goals of the Congress that created
it.49 Another nascent legal issue is how the law should respond to suggestions
that substantially more North American plants and animals are “imperiled”
than fall within the protections of the ESA.50 While a legal rule that responds
to these suggestions might better carry out Congress’s intent to protect en-
dangered species, it might also prevent projects that both harm individual
members of endangered species and have the potential to help the overall
population of those same species survive,51 especially if coupled with other,
more focused conservation efforts. Other potential legal controversies aris-
ing out of changing scientific knowledge or industrial development are hard-
er to discern or do not yet exist. This Note, however, intends to provide at
least one example of how ambiguities in the text of critical environmental
statutes created by the shifting sands of American industry and scientific
knowledge can be resolved by dynamic interpretation of Congress’s intent
and purpose to protect and preserve our environment.
II. EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS
Although five circuit courts have weighed in on the Act’s scope,52 a ma-
jority of circuits have not, leaving businesses, regulators, and prosecutors
uncertain of what exactly is prohibited. This legal uncertainty—which is es-
pecially troubling in the context of criminal sanctions53—is compounded by
changes in protected birds’ migratory behavior as a result of climate
change.54 These factors lead to considerable variation in the kinds of conduct
that can result in convictions under the Act. As a result, federal prosecutors
have more discretionary power in jurisdictions where more conduct falls
within the Act’s scope. The confluence of legal, environmental, and prosecu-
49 . See id . at 352.
50 . See David S. Wilcove & Lawrence L. Master, How Many Endangered Species Are
There in the United States?, 3 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 414 (2005).
51 . See infra notes 127–137 and accompanying text.
52. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010); Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
53 . See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).
54 . See Jay Zaifman et al., Shifts in Bird Migration Timing in North American Long-
Distance and Short-Distance Migrants Are Associated with Climate Change, INT’L J. ZOOLOGY
(2017), https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijz/2017/6025646/ (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (discussing the impact of climate change on migratory bird patterns in various regions
of the United States); see also Anders Pape Møller et al., Populations of Migratory Bird Species
that Did Not Show a Phenological Response to Climate Change Are Declining, 105 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 16, 197 (2008), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/105/42/16195.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LX55-3X8Y] (discussing how climate change has affected when and to where
migratory birds in the Northern Hemisphere travel during mating season).
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torial uncertainty is a powerful disincentive for businesses55 and a major in-
hibitor for regulators seeking to encourage private businesses to engage in
activity benefitting their policy objectives.56 The circuit courts’ distinct con-
structions of the Act encompass different conduct and create distinctions on
two axes: directness and intent.
This Part describes the three distinct appellate court approaches and
briefly highlights their merits and potential problems. Section II.A outlines
the approach adopted by the Second and Tenth Circuits and criticizes this
approach’s potential to inhibit environmental regulatory agencies from car-
rying out their statutory mandates and its (perhaps counterintuitive) tension
with the purpose of the Act. Section II.B outlines the approach adopted by
the Ninth and Eighth Circuits and addresses some of the underlying forces
that motivated Congress to enact the Act and how this approach may fail to
fully address those forces. Section II.C outlines the approach adopted by the
Fifth Circuit and argues that the approach renders the text of the Act im-
permissibly redundant and does not conform to the general methods courts
use when construing criminal statutes. Section II.D discusses how these
courts are mostly missing each other’s points and sets the stage for the solu-
tion I propose in Part III.
A. The Second and Tenth Circuits
The first construction of the Act determined that neither directness nor
intent is necessary to violate the Act. The Second Circuit held in FMC Corp .
that chemical pollution of a pond leading to the deaths of dozens of birds
that swam in it fell within the Act’s prohibition on “kill[ing]” migratory
birds.57 The court first looked to cases where there was conduct directed at
birds, like hunting, and found that they “have consistently held that ‘it is not
necessary . . . that a defendant violated [the Act] with guilty knowledge or
specific intent to commit the violation.’ ”58 The court then addressed direct-
ness, drawing on the seminal tort case Rylands v . Fletcher,59 which held that
actors who engage in “extrahazardous activities” should be held strictly liable
for harms caused by those activities.60 Determining that the principle was
“the same as in . . . tort,”61 the court held that corporations are strictly liable
55 . See Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”—A Cri-
tique of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 312–14, 316–21
(2012).
56 . See, e .g ., Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585–86 (9th Cir. 2016).
57 . FMC Corp ., 572 F.2d at 904–05, 908.
58 . Id . at 906 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966)). The
court likened corporate violation of the Act to public welfare offenses, where corporate execu-
tives can be held liable for failing to prevent harms when they are in the best position to pre-
vent them. Id . at 906–07.
59. [1868] 3 LRE & I. App. 330 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
60 . FMC Corp ., 572 F.2d at 907.
61 . Id .
798 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:789
for conduct resulting in the death of migratory birds, at least under circum-
stances where they can be fairly described as engaging in extrahazardous ac-
tivity.62
The Tenth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the Act took its form
through two cases: United States v . Corrow63 and United States v . Apollo En-
ergies, Inc .64 In Corrow, the court determined that the Act’s lack of an explicit
mens rea requirement created a strict liability misdemeanor.65 Apollo Ener-
gies, meanwhile, held that strict liability extended to the taking or killing of
migratory birds as well as to their possession or sale.66
One potential problem with this broad approach is that it “stretches” the
text of the Act far beyond what its plain meaning was at the time of enact-
ment.67 The logical force of this argument is that “take” and “kill”—
debatably the only ambiguous terms in the list of prohibited conduct that al-
so relate to the deaths of migratory birds—are surrounded by terms that are
unambiguously direct (e.g., “pursue, hunt . . . capture, [and] possess”).68 Fur-
thermore, there are forceful arguments that the word “take” has an unam-
biguously direct nature at common law.69 This traditional “ordinary mean-
ing” is definitive unless persuasive evidence exists to abandon it,70 and unlike
in Babbitt v . Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, there
is no such compelling evidence here.71
If “take” is properly construed narrowly, then “kill” becomes a single
ambiguous verb surrounded by five others that clearly require conduct di-
rected at migratory birds; Congress’s near-exclusive use of unambiguously
direct verbs counsels a construction of “kill” that shares the quality of direct-
62 . See id . at 908.
63. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
64. 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
65 . Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805.
66 . Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 685.
67 . See Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997).
68 . See, e .g ., id .
69. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717–18
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70 . See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“[T]he plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an
axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evi-
dence if it exists.’ ” (quoting Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928))).
Contra Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (“Resolving
whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for purposes of the pre-emption provision begins ‘with the lan-
guage of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where the inquiry should end,’ for ‘the statute’s lan-
guage is plain.’ ” (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989))).
71 . See 515 U.S. at 691 (analyzing Congress’s expanded definition of “take” in the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)). In Sweet Home, the Court analyzed the
meaning of the “take” in the ESA. Within the ESA, Congress gave an explicit definition of
“take,” superseding the term’s ordinary meaning. Id . Congress gave no such definition in the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
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ness.72 An improperly expansive judicial construction of the Act risks deter-
ring beneficial business ventures and undermining administrative agencies’
authority. Congressional intent, gleaned through the text and legislative his-
tory, suggests the Second Circuit’s interpretation is too broad.
Congress drafted the Act broadly with the intent to capture many kinds
of conduct. The Act provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pur-
sue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer
for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for
shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported,
deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or
cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or ex-
port, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any
product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in
whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in
the terms of the conventions . . . .73
This laundry list indicates that Congress intended to proscribe a great variety
of conduct that is ultimately injurious to birds—even conduct that only indi-
rectly causes destruction of migratory bird populations. The majority of spe-
cific conduct listed has nothing to do with the actual taking or killing of mi-
gratory birds but with what happens to those birds or portions of their
remains after they are dead.
This language suggests congressional intent to prevent conduct that in-
directly leads to the death of migratory birds. But these prohibitions are not
really about conduct that indirectly kills birds; instead they address the ex-
ternal circumstances that induced people to intentionally kill migratory birds
for financial gain. Congress went to great pains to capture so much conduct
yet failed to explicitly include indirect killings in addition to conduct that in-
directly encouraged killing of birds. The principle of expressio unius suggests
that such conduct was intentionally omitted from the proscriptions of the
Act.74
The Act’s legislative history is primarily concerned with effectuating the
purposes of the “convention[] between the United States and Great Britain
for the protection of migratory birds.”75 But because the Act is essentially a
72 . See id . at 720–21 (“The fact that ‘several items in a list share an attribute counsels in
favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.’ ” (quoting Beecham v.
United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994))).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
74 . See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (“[E]xpressing one item of a com-
monly associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned . . . .”).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012). The convention itself was merely an end around the Su-
preme Court’s pre-Wickard v . Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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reenactment of the Weeks-McLean Act,76 it is also appropriate to look to the
legislative history of that Act.
The language of the convention and the legislative history of Weeks-
McLean suggest a narrower construction of the Act. The convention calls for
the United States to restrict the hunting season during breeding and migra-
tory periods in order to protect bird populations.77 It also specifically allows
for the creation of exemptions: for instance, when birds become destructive
to “agricultural or other interests.”78 This exemption clause uses the poten-
tially broader term “kill,”79 but the implicit requirement that a community
have good reason for acquiring an exemption suggests “kill[ings]” are inten-
tional.
As discussed below, the purpose of Weeks-McLean was to reduce the
pressure on migratory bird populations, but the remedy that Congress was
most eager to implement addressed overhunting. Weeks-McLean authorized
and compelled the Department of Agriculture to “designate suitable dis-
tricts . . . within which said closed seasons it shall not be lawful to shoot or by
any device kill” certain designated migratory birds.80 In support of his name-
sake bill, Senator George P. McLean gave a lengthy explanation of the prob-
lem it was meant to address. He explained the value of insectivorous birds to
farmers and lamented that many farmers were apathetic to, or even partici-
pated in, their overhunting as “game.”81 Although there is a sense in his
speech of general stewardship of birds,82 the emphasis on hunting and
“gam[ing]”83 throughout indicates that McLean imagined the bill as primari-
ly about people’s direct actions.
Moreover, imposing criminal sanctions on business executives that indi-
rectly cause the deaths of migratory birds has substantial costs. In FMC
76. Although the Act’s laundry list may seem daunting compared to the more concise
bill proposed by Senator McLean, discussed infra, both the critical terms I analyze appear in
Weeks-McLean and the Act.
77. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Mi-
gratory Birds, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. III, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter Migratory Birds
Convention].
78 . Id . art. VII.
79 . Id .
80. 49 CONG. REC. 1484 (1913).
81 . Id . at 1486.
82 . See id . One of the many sources Senator McLean quoted on the floor was the Clifton
Game and Forest Society of North America, which compared the pre-industrial American
landscape to the Garden of Eden. Id .; see René Dubos, Franciscan Conservation Versus Benedic-
tine Stewardship, in ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 56, 57 (R.J. Berry ed. 2006) (“The Bene-
dictine rule in contrast seems inspired . . . [by] the second chapter [of Genesis], in which the
good Lord placed man in the Garden of Eden not as a master but rather in a spirit of steward-
ship.”).
83. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 933 (Philip Babcock Gove et
al. eds., 1961) (defining “game animal” as “an animal made legitimate quarry by . . . law”); id . at
1860 (providing the archaic—but most relevant—definition of “quarry” as “to hunt down (a
game animal)”).
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Corp ., the Second Circuit justified its expansive construction of the Act by
analogy to public welfare crimes.84 But the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine has its critics.85 The threat of criminal liability creates overhead costs
that may be passed on to consumers or prevent firms from using these funds
for beneficial business ventures. These costs may be justified if they produce
sufficient public benefit to outweigh them.86 On the other hand, the effect a
broad interpretation of the Act would have on public–private partnerships
that can mitigate the negative impacts of climate change on migratory birds
must be weighed among the costs.87
Relatedly, the reluctance or financial inability of private actors to engage
in these public–private partnerships inhibits certain environmental regulato-
ry agencies in carrying out their statutory mandates. In Protect Our Commu-
nities Foundation v . Jewell, private environmental organizations and activists
sued the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management
(the “BLM”), seeking to enjoin the BLM from granting a right-of-way permit
to a private corporation to construct and operate a wind farm in Southern
California.88 Ultimately, the court held that the Act “does not contemplate
attenuated secondary liability on agencies like the BLM that act in a purely
regulatory capacity, and whose regulatory acts do not directly or proximately
cause the ‘take’ of migratory birds.”89 It is not impossible, however, to imag-
ine a scenario where a different court of appeals could be persuaded by the
plaintiffs’ argument. If that circuit followed the expansive interpretation of
the Act supported by the Second and Tenth Circuits, it could dramatically
impair the ability of regulatory agencies like the BLM to carry out their statu-
tory purposes.
This outcome would also run counter to the purpose of the Act. If courts
regularly enjoined the BLM and other environmental regulatory agencies
from granting right-of-way permits, they would be unable to engage in pub-
lic–private partnerships like the one at issue in Protect Our Communities. In
2010, partnerships like this produced nearly 12,000 megawatts of wind ener-
gy in just eleven western states,90 reducing carbon emissions by tens of mil-
lions of metric tons.91
84. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906–08 (2d Cir. 1978).
85 . E .g ., Petrin, supra note 55.
86 . Id . at 311–14, 316–21 (describing the huge costs private firms sink into legal compli-
ance, indemnifying executives, increased liability insurance, and diminished efficiency as a re-
sult of potentially liable executives “micro-managing” corporate activities).
87 . See Tyson Lies, Note, Strict Liability Is for the Birds: A Comparison of Take Under
the MBTA and ESA, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 213–16 (2013).
88. 825 F.3d 571, 576–78 (9th Cir. 2016).
89 . Id . at 585.
90 . See SCOTT HAASE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WESTERN REGION
RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 5
tbl.1 (2012), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/53540.pdf [https://perma.cc/897H-7FFJ]; see
also BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
ON WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED LANDS IN THE WESTERN UNITED
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The solution proposed below avoids this problem by offering legal cer-
tainty that conduct that indirectly and unintentionally results in the deaths
of protected birds does not fall within the Act’s scope. This rule will likely
result in the proliferation of these projects, but as I argue in Part III, that is a
good thing—even for protected birds—because the implementation of long-
term, low-carbon energy solutions will do more to ensure the survival of
protected bird species than an expansive definition of the Act can, and pub-
lic–private partnerships are integral to the development of energy solutions.
B. The Ninth and Eighth Circuits
In 1991 and 1997, respectively, the Ninth and Eighth Circuits adopted
the second prevailing construction of the Act.92 In Seattle Audubon Society v .
Evans, the Ninth Circuit held that, unlike in the ESA,93 the definition of the
word “take” in the Act is narrow and does not reach indirect killings of mi-
gratory birds resulting from the destruction of their habitat.94 In Newton
County Wildlife Ass’n v . United States Forest Service, the Eighth Circuit re-
jected an Apollo Energies–style broad construction—that the Act creates a
strict liability misdemeanor95—and held that “the ambiguous terms ‘take’
and ‘kill’ . . . mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the stat-
ute’s enactment in 1918.’ ”96
Although both courts insist that the Act only reaches conduct directed at
migratory birds, when such direct conduct results in the death of a protected
bird, strict liability is “appropriate.”97 So when a hunter shoots a bird that she
thinks can be killed legally, but inadvertently kills a protected migratory bird,
STATES, tbl. 5.13-1 (2005), http://windeis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/maintext/Vol1/
Vol1Ch5.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9FC-XXN3] [hereinafter BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., IMPACT
STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY] (projecting megawatts per year produced through public–
private windmill projects in 2005, 2015, and 2025).
91 . Wind Energy Reduces Greenhouse Gas Emissions, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://
www.awea.org/reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/49NP-V29G] (explain-
ing that “10,432 MW of wind power . . . is expected to reduce almost 24.2 million metric tons
of additional CO2 per year”).
92 . See Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997);
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
94 . Compare Seattle Audubon, 952 F.2d at 303, with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (holding that habitat destruction, which indirectly
lead to the death of an endangered species, constituted an illegal ‘taking’ within the meaning of
the ESA).
95. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 685 (10th Cir. 2010).
96 . Newton Cty . Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115 (quoting Seattle Audubon, 952 F.2d at
302).
97 . See id . (“Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers.
But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an abso-
lute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the
death of migratory birds.”).
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it is no defense for her to explain that she thought the bird was in season. In
other words, directness, but not intent, is required to violate the Act under
this construction.98 Notably, the Newton County holding is subtly broader,
because it extends the Seattle Audubon construction of “take” to “kill” as
well.
Even though the reach of “take” may be properly limited by its historic
meaning, the Act is not necessarily so limited. Ordinary people use the word
“kill” all the time, and its ordinary meaning is broader than the traditional
meaning of “take.”99 When courts construe “kill” within the Act to mean its
broad, everyday definition, they hold that conduct causing the death of mi-
gratory birds, even unintentionally and indirectly, falls within the prohibi-
tions of the Act.100 Yet this cannot end the inquiry because, unlike with
“take” above, there is persuasive evidence for abandoning the broad ordinary
meaning of “kill.” Noscitur a sociis “counsels in favor of interpreting . . .
[take] as possessing . . . [an element of directness] as well.”101 But to imbue
the term “kill” with the directness that is already inherent in the term “take”
would debatably make the terms identical,102 contrary to the rule against
surplusage.103 So, when considering the meanings of each word and not
looking outside the text, reaching a resolution we can feel confident in (and
that comports with accepted canons of statutory construction) is a challenge.
In situations like this, courts should turn to other indicia of statutory inter-
pretation to determine the proper construction. After the language of the
text itself,104 the chief tool used to determine congressional intent is legisla-
tive history.105
The legislative history suggests that Congress was most concerned with
addressing “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poach-
ers.”106 But the careful reservation of an exception to the prohibition and the
provision of a method for receiving special permits reveal that the word
“kill” captures something more. In the convention, the word “kill” is pri-
98 . But see Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 686 (declining to follow Newton Cty . Wildlife
Ass’n, 113 F.3d 110).
99 . See WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 83, at 1242, 2329–30. See generally HARPER LEE,
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960); KILL BILL: VOLUME 1 (Miramax Films 2003).
100 . See, e .g ., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978).
101. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 720–21
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994)).
102 . See infra text accompanying notes 130–131.
103 . See infra text accompanying notes 130–131. But see Benjamin Means, Note, Prohib-
iting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97
MICH. L. REV. 823, 827–29 (1998); but see also Maxel Moreland, Note, Migratory Bird Act:
What Does Taking Mean?, U. CIN. L. REV. F. (Dec. 8, 2015), https://uclawreview.org/2015/12/
08/migratory-bird-act-what-does-taking-mean/ [https://perma.cc/MDN2-BDUB].
104. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 395 (2018).
105 . Id . § 452.
106. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991).
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marily associated with the exception specifically.107 So, while the Ninth Cir-
cuit properly construed “take,” the Eighth Circuit erred in extending the di-
rectness limitation to the word “kill.” And even if the Eighth Circuit is right
that a narrow interpretation of both “take” and “kill” is proper, the question
remains whether this narrower construction undercuts the Act’s purpose in
service to an overly formalistic interpretation of its text.
The purpose of the Act was to protect migratory bird populations from
the havoc wrought by human commercial activities.108 The Act’s text indi-
cates that the specific conduct it was most concerned with was the hunting of
migratory birds,109 but the forces that animated that conduct were funda-
mentally commercial.110 The Act was a direct response to the pressure of
these economic forces and the dire straits they created for migratory birds.111
Today there are equally dramatic commercial considerations encouraging
conduct that poses great danger to migratory birds: the production of pesti-
cides and other powerful chemicals for agribusiness,112 the construction of
skyscrapers for office space and luxury housing,113 and the provision of ener-
gy to fuel the American economy.114 The drafters of the Act acknowledged
the fundamentally commercial nature of the threats to migratory birds and
proscribed a range of conduct that contributed to their diminishing popula-
tions.115 If the Act’s purpose is to protect migratory birds from existential
crises driven by commercial pressures, then construing the Act to apply al-
most exclusively to hunters simply because hunting was the primary com-
mercial threat to migratory birds at the time of enactment is to betray its es-
sential character.
The Act sought to address economic and cultural pressures (particularly
women’s fashion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and
107 . See Migratory Birds Convention, supra note 77.
108. Ogden, supra note 20, at 5–6 (discussing the damage done to bird populations by
factors ranging from technological advancement to western expansion and urbanization to
women’s fashion).
109 . See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); see, e .g ., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905–
06 (2d Cir. 1978) (beginning discussion of the indirect killing of migratory birds by giving
background on the more intuitive cases involving hunters); supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
110 . See Ogden, supra note 20, at 5.
111 . Id . at 6 (“[T]he framers of the MBTA were determined to put an end to the com-
mercial trade in birds and their feathers that, by the early years of the twentieth century, had
wreaked havoc on the populations of many native bird species.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Migratory Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated June 28, 2018), https://
www.fws.gov/verobeach/MigratoryBird.html [https://perma.cc/426F-9S9P])).
112 . See FMC Corp ., 572 F.2d 902.
113. Ogden, supra note 20, at 9, 76–77, 79.
114 . See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
115 . See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012) (prohibiting not only the taking or killing of migratory
birds, but also the possession, sale, and distribution of “any part, nest, or egg thereof”).
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the effects of overhunting on migratory bird populations.116 The broad statu-
tory language and the history of the convention and Weeks-McLean indicate
that the concern about overhunting was animated by the threat it posed to
the survival of bird populations.117 The convention mentions the value of
migratory birds for controlling insects harmful to agriculture,118 but this is
better understood as an anticipated benefit of the Act than as its purpose.
And in a time where there are other, more easily controlled ways of limiting
insect-related damage to crops, it should not be understood as its primary
purpose today. The Act emerged after two decades of federal efforts to pro-
tect birds and as part of the larger conservation movement of the early twen-
tieth century.119 Viewed in this light, the Act’s purpose must be understood
broadly as protecting migratory birds for their utility and as parts of the en-
vironment generally. The Act not only changed the commercial incentives to
harm migratory birds but also influenced cultural norms surrounding the
use of animal parts.120 The Act’s text addressed hunting most directly, but
the forces that animated overhunting were fundamentally commercial.121
Today, there is less concern that women’s fashion presents an existential
crisis to migratory birds, but there are still major commercial factors, like
skyscrapers and energy production, that kill tens or hundreds of millions of
birds annually—including some protected by the Act.122 Although the Act
was specifically formulated with those earlier concerns in the background,
the drafters did not have the benefit of direct experience with skyscrapers
and modern industrial energy production. These modern phenomena carry
environmental costs and benefits, both generally and to migratory birds spe-
cifically. In 1918, Congress could not weigh these costs and benefits to make
an explicit policy decision about which interest should prevail. Instead,
courts are left to determine which interest has the most weight given the
purpose of the Act.
Though many birds are killed in collisions with skyscrapers in the Unit-
ed States, a court holding that these deaths fall within the meaning of the Act
would undercut the Act’s purpose. Tall buildings have proliferated over the
last several decades as a larger portion of the United States population has
become concentrated in urban areas,123 and this trend is likely to continue
116. Ogden, supra note 20, at 5–6; see 56 CONG. REC. 7362 (1918) (“Civilization, ever ad-
vancing along the world’s pathway, pleads for humanity, for the birds, so helpless and yet so
useful.”).
117 . See supra Section II.A.
118. Migratory Birds Convention, supra note 77.
119. Greenspan, supra note 21; Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note 17.
120 . See Ogden, supra note 20, at 5–6.
121 . See id . at 5.
122 . See id . at 6–8.
123 . Cf . DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD URBANIZATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION 12 (2014), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/
wup2014-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRF8-XN6Z].
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into the foreseeable future.124 Yet this concentration of human population
also brings with it distinct advantages for migratory birds in the form of re-
duced carbon emissions,125 helping to mitigate the impact of human industry
on the life cycles and survival of migratory birds.
The impact of modern industrial energy production is also somewhat
mixed but ultimately suggests that a narrower construction better serves the
purpose of the Act. In 2001, windmills killed approximately 33,000 birds
(2.19 birds per windmill),126 and they are only becoming more common as
“green energy” becomes more socially and economically desirable.127 Other,
non-”green” methods of energy production also result in the deaths of mi-
gratory birds,128 but these methods are much more like other forms of tradi-
tional industry than windmills. Traditional industry was already a major part
of the American economy in 1918, and although members of Congress
acknowledged that industrial progress posed an inherent threat to migratory
birds, Congress expressed no intent to halt such progress.129 It cannot be
credibly argued that the Act prohibits traditional methods of industrial ener-
gy production.
Construing the Act to include deaths resulting from migratory birds’
collisions with windmills would discourage their construction. Commercial
interests would turn to other methods of energy production, increasing car-
bon emissions and exacerbating climate change and its negative effects on
migratory bird populations. Although energy producers could readily pre-
vent the kinds of bird casualties that resulted in litigation in FMC Corp . and
CITGO, it is much more difficult to account for the long-term damage to the
environment, including migratory birds, that would result from a stunted
green energy movement. Thus, construing the Act to exclude traditional in-
dustrial energy production does not contravene its purpose, but an over-
broad construction that embraces windmills may actually make the Act
counterproductive and ultimately reduce long-term security for migratory
bird populations.
The resolution proposed below will allow for projects that may have
negative impacts on individual protected birds but can reasonably be ex-
pected to have long-term benefits for protected bird species as a whole.
124 . Id .
125 . See, e .g ., Daniel Hoornweg et. al, Cities and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Moving For-
ward, 23 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 207, 211–13 tbl.2 (2011). Of particular relevance are the data
on page 212 showing that many major U.S. cities have lower greenhouse gas emissions per cap-
ita than the United States as a whole.
126. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., IMPACT STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY, supra note 90, at
57.
127 . E .g ., Justin Worland, Renewable Energy Continues to Beat Fossil Fuels, TIME (Feb. 8,
2017), http://time.com/4662116/renewable-energy-fossil-fuels-growth/ [https://perma.cc/
BPX4-YXKV].
128 . E .g ., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
129. 56 CONG. REC. 7362 (1918). Inherent in the statement of Congressman Stedman in
support of the Act, supra, is the assumption that industry will continuously progress.
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C. The Fifth Circuit
Recently, the Fifth Circuit gave the Act the narrowest construction of all
the circuit courts. The court ostensibly endorsed the Ninth and Eighth Cir-
cuits in holding “that a ‘taking’ is limited to deliberate acts done directly and
intentionally to migratory birds,”130 but this mischaracterizes the holdings of
those circuits and fails to grasp the strength of the position the court itself
sets out in its decision. As explained above, no other circuit court has held
that only intentional conduct is proscribed under the Act. In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit declared: “acts (or omissions) that indirectly or accidentally kill
migratory birds” do not amount to a “tak[ing]” within the meaning of the
Act.131 The court’s analysis on this point is unclear and difficult to parse,
however, because just a few sentences later it concedes, “There is no doubt
that a hunter who shoots a migratory bird without a permit in the mistaken
belief that it is not a migratory bird may be strictly liable for a ‘taking’ under
the [Act].”132
In addition to potentially undermining the purpose of the Act, like the
construction offered by the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit’s ap-
proach denies the word “kill” an independent meaning. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Sweet Home,133 decided in 1995 after Seattle Audubon So-
ciety134 but before Newton County,135 is instructive. In Sweet Home, the Court
held that the Department of the Interior’s determination that habitat de-
struction causing the deaths of an endangered species constituted an illegal
“tak[ing]” within the meaning of the ESA was a reasonable interpretation of
the statute and entitled to Chevron136 deference.137 The Fifth Circuit distin-
guished the ESA and the Act by pointing out that the ESA further defined
the verb “take,” thereby expanding its well-known common law meaning,
while the Act offers no such statutory definition.138 But even if “takings” are
fundamentally direct and intentional, to impute those meanings to the word
“kill” makes the words coextensive. It is difficult to imagine a direct and in-
tentional killing of an animal that is not also a “tak[ing].” And while the
Eighth Circuit faced a similar issue because it seemed to extend only the di-
rectness element of “take” to “kill,”139 the Fifth Circuit’s decision, at least if
130. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp ., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 (5th Cir. 2015).
131 . Id . at 492 (emphasis added).
132 . Id .
133. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691, 707
(1995).
134. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
136. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
137. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012 & Supp. V 2018); Sweet Home,
515 U.S. at 708.
138. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2015).
139 . See Newton Cty . Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d 110.
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taken at face value, extends both directness and intent, making the words
completely coextensive.
The court’s holding that the Act requires intentional conduct is on shaky
ground. No other court of appeals has held that intentional conduct is re-
quired.140 When a criminal statute is silent on the issue of mens rea, like the
Act, courts readily read in such a requirement.141 Some express or implied
indication by Congress that it intended to dispense with the mens rea re-
quirement is required before courts will hold defendants strictly liable.142 But
“[w]hen interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required
mental state, [courts] read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is nec-
essary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise “innocent conduct.” ’ ”143
The Supreme Court has not shied away from holding reckless conduct as
culpable.144 The Fifth Circuit only addressed this subject obliquely by giving
the example of a motorist who strikes a bird with his or her car, killing it.145
This act is direct and unintentional, but not blameworthy. From this the
court determined that there must be intent but failed to elaborate or consid-
er whether recklessness satisfies the mens rea requirement of a federal crimi-
nal statute that is silent on mental state.146
These three competing constructions of the Act lead to varying degrees
of criminal liability and regulatory effect and make it difficult for the United
States to implement a uniform environmental policy. It is time for the Su-
preme Court to resolve the split in the lower courts.
D. Construing the Act
The two-pronged analysis outlined above provides for four possible con-
structions of the Act. All of them have been adopted by at least one court of
appeals, except for the bizarre interpretation that would hold only intention-
al indirect killings prohibited under the Act. The disagreement between
courts demonstrates that the Act’s meaning is anything but “plain” to edu-
cated observers. Any interpretation of a statute purporting to give its words
meaning should start with what it says,147 and so independent analysis of the
Act’s text is warranted. As should be clear from the discussion above, analy-
140 . But see United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010); Newton
Cty . Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d 110; Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
141 . See, e .g ., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994).
142 . Id . at 606.
143. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2010 (2015) (quoting Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
144 . See id . at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 493 (5th Cir. 2015).
146 . See id .
147 . See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 440 (2014) (quoting Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)).
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sis of the text alone cannot provide an answer beyond simply choosing the
interpretation whose reasoning one finds most persuasive already.
No court of appeals that has analyzed both terms has treated them sepa-
rately.148 And it is difficult to discern exactly where the disagreement be-
tween the courts lies because they have either analyzed one149 or none150 of
the relevant terms.151 No two courts analyzing the same term have disagreed
on that term’s meaning. Every circuit court that has focused its analysis on
the meaning of “take” alone has construed the Act narrowly. The Second
Circuit (the only court to focus on “kill”) construed it broadly.152 The unan-
imous opinion of the courts of appeals that have analyzed “take” suggests
that a narrow reading of that term is proper.153
But given two terms with very different ordinary meanings154 and charg-
ing documents presenting very different interpretive questions on ap-
peal155—particularly, absent a readily available tiebreaker like Chevron defer-
148. The Fifth Circuit confined its analysis to the language of the indictment, which only
alleged an illegal “taking” and did not use the word “kill.” CITGO Petroleum, 801 F.3d at 489.
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar situation; appellant’s legal theory rested on the
characterization of habitat destruction leading to the deaths of migratory birds as an illegal
“taking.” Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991); see also City of
Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004). But cf . Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). The Second Circuit focused on the word
“kill”—presumably because it was the term used in the indictment. See United States v. FMC
Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1978).
149. The Eighth Circuit claimed to analyze both terms, but really just treated them as a
single analytical unit. It was presented with similar facts as those in Seattle Audubon, 952 F.2d
297 (lumber sales approved by the BLM were destroying migratory birds’ habitat), but in
“agree[ing] with the Ninth Circuit,” the Eighth Circuit characterized the Ninth Circuit’s hold-
ing in Seattle Audubon as construing both “take” and “kill” as limited to the “physical conduct
of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers.” Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seattle Audubon, 952 F.2d at 302). Contra Se-
attle Audubon, 952 F.2d at 302 (construing only the meaning of the term “take,” not “kill”
(emphasis added)).
150. The Tenth Circuit, feeling bound by its earlier decision in United States v . Corrow,
119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997), did not specifically analyze the scope of either term. United
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684–85 (10th Cir. 2010).
151. I reiterate that the Eighth Circuit did not really analyze the word “kill.” It merely
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the term “take” alone and applied it to both terms. The
court devotes exactly one sentence of independent analysis of the Act before applying the
Ninth Circuit’s construction of “take” to both terms. Newton Cty . Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at
115 (“But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an
absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in
the death of migratory birds.”).
152 . FMC Corp ., 572 F.2d 902.
153 . See CITGO Petroleum, 801 F.3d at 489; Newton Cty . Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115;
Seattle Audobon, 952 F.2d at 302.
154 . See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
155 . See supra note 148.
810 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:789
ence156—it is unsurprising that the courts of appeals have been talking past
each other. In situations like this, courts should turn to other indicia of
statutory interpretation to determine the proper construction. As discussed
above, congressional intent points toward constructions of “take” and “kill”
where the words perform entirely different functions.157 “Takes” are neces-
sarily directed at protected birds, but there is no element of intent; “kills” are
indirect but necessarily intentional.158 This leaves us with purpose to resolve
the issue. The purpose of the Act was to preserve bird populations by ad-
dressing the economic and cultural forces that threatened migratory birds. A
relatively narrow approach best serves this purpose.
Thus, the construction most in line with the Act’s purpose is one that al-
lows for aggressive development of alternative energy sources and the ac-
commodation of expanding urban populations in American cities, which re-
duce transit-related carbon emissions159 and require less fuel to heat and cool
smaller living spaces. An appropriate construction must exclude these areas
to allow for progress in the long-term fight against global warming for the
benefit of migratory birds, among other interests.
III. A NEW JURISPRUDENTIAL PREFERENCE FOR AGING
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
The best solution for dealing with the coming glut of interpretive issues
relating to our aging environmental statutes is to develop a special interpre-
tive rule to guide courts in their decisionmaking, avoiding potential conflict
and confusion. The rule would tell the lower courts which indicia of statuto-
ry interpretation are most important for construing aging environmental
statutes. The rule I propose is a “jurisprudential preference”160 for purpose.
It is not unusual for courts to develop special rules of statutory construc-
tion when interpreting certain kinds of legal texts, or even specific statutes.
156. This could be an appropriate situation in which to apply the rule of lenity; however,
“[t]he principle of strict construction ‘does not mean that every criminal statute must be given
the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.’ ” Unit-
ed States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Bramblett 348
U.S. 503, 510 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995) (plurality
opinion in part)); accord United States v. Farraj, 142 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Because
the legislative intent and statutory purpose, analyzed infra Part III, counsel for a narrow—but
not the narrowest—construction application of the rule of lenity is inappropriate. Further, be-
cause there are three options from which to choose, a binary tiebreaker like the rule of lenity
cannot resolve the uncertainty.
157 . See notes supra 73–82 and accompanying text.
158 . Cf . CITGO Petroleum, 801 F.3d at 477, 489. Bear in mind that an intentional “kill-
ing” that is the result of conduct directed at a migratory bird would simply meet the definition
of a “take.” See id . at 489 n.10.
159 . See Hoornweg et al., supra note 125, at 214.
160. This is certainly something less than a canon of construction but something more
than particular jurists’ personal preferences or individual ideas about the law. I mean for it to
be something firmer.
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For example, courts will not, when construing a treaty, “alter, amend, or
add” to it at all;161 when construing criminal statutes, they resolve intractable
ambiguities in favor of the accused162 and refrain from retroactive applica-
tion;163 and they construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act narrowly as
a matter of course.164 The purposes of environmental statutes, by their na-
ture, are inevitably forward-looking. Whether the end sought is preservation
of wetlands or restoration of a damaged forest or the protection of migratory
birds, these undertakings are fundamentally about the future. The common
character of concern for the future justifies a new jurisprudential preference.
By regularly performing “background checks” on potential ambiguities in
environmental statutes relative to their purpose, courts will be empowered to
accomplish Congress’s stated goals and avoid undercutting them with for-
malist backstops.165
This proposal avoids the pitfalls of the existing interpretations. Unlike
the overly broad interpretation adopted by the Second and Tenth Circuits, it
will not stymie important energy-producing and carbon-emission-reducing
developments. Unlike the overly narrow interpretation of the Ninth and
Eighth Circuits, it does not protect those who intentionally, but indirectly,
cause deaths of protected birds. And unlike the Fifth Circuit’s recent deci-
sion, it preserves the independent meanings of “take” and “kill” while main-
taining fidelity to their ordinary meanings. This interpretative thicket
demonstrates that clarity in the area of environmental law can be difficult to
maintain as the environment and industrial economy change. The difficulty
of this dynamism and the pressure it puts on the environment are precisely
the problems that Congressman Stedman acknowledged on the floor in 1918
when he urged his colleagues in Congress to pass the Act.166
Of course, these dynamic forces not only affect the Act and its bounda-
ries but also other cornerstone environmental protection statutes. As these
161. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821); accord Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 406 n.24 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307–09 (1829), and The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71). “Liberal”
use of nontextual evidence is not to be confused with expansive definition or disregard for
clear provisions. World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1319–20 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
162 . See, e .g ., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion).
163 . See, e .g ., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265–66 (1994).
164. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014); see also Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992) (“The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq ., establishes a comprehensive framework for deter-
mining whether a court in this country, state or federal, may exercise jurisdiction over a for-
eign state.” (emphasis added)).
165 . But see Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal—Or, Why
the Clean Air Act Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 474–76 (2018) (arguing that a purpose-driven approach to interpretation
of environmental law leads to “interpretive creep,” which elevates the purposes of only a subset
of the Congresses that passed environmental laws).
166 . See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
812 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:789
statutes age and give rise to similar interpretive questions, courts will have to
wrestle with newly born ambiguities that cannot be resolved by resorting to
the text alone, like those in the Act itself.167 Although these dynamic changes
will surely occur, it is likely impossible for Congress to foresee the specific
interpretive ambiguities that will require policy adjustments. It may have
seemed easier in the past to frame many key environmental statutes as cag-
ing industry to protect the environment,168 but now these interests are often
more intertwined.
For these reasons, when environmental statutes are rendered ambigu-
ous, courts should place greater emphasis on preserving statutory purpose.
As it stands, courts go through the motions of a statutory analysis demon-
strating that the text is ambiguous. But, because these ambiguities inhere in
environmental protection statutes as they age, courts should dispose of this
formalistic ritual. Instead, they should undertake a three-step analysis. First,
they should rely on the text to narrow the scope of ambiguity. Second, they
should apply the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation to reach a first-
look conclusion. Third, they should subject the conclusion to a “background
check” against the statute’s purpose.169 If the first-look result would mean-
ingfully undercut the statute’s purpose, then it fails the background check,
and the interpretation that is most in-line with the statute’s purpose should
prevail.
For example, ongoing debates about the extent to which groundwater
pollution can be federally regulated under the Clean Water Act170 should be
resolved using the same tools used to construe any statute. Then, courts
should go one step further by subjecting the result to the question: Does this
result undercut Congress’s purpose to protect U.S. waterways through a co-
operatively federalist system of regulation?171 Similarly, a court interpreting
the Clean Air Act’s grant of power to the EPA, should it find that the ordi-
167 . See supra Part II.
168 . See, e .g ., 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2012) (“For the purpose of this section, the Adminis-
trator is authorized to make joint investigations with any such agencies of the condition of any
waters in any State or States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial wastes, or sub-
stance which may adversely affect such waters.”); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2012) (“The Congress
finds . . . that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by ur-
banization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in
mounting dangers . . . .”).
169. This is not unlike how courts interpret ambiguous treaty provisions. See, e .g .,
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699–700 (1988) (“When inter-
preting a treaty, we ‘begin “with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.” ’ Other general rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or
ambiguous passages. ‘ ”Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ‘ ” (citation omitted)
(quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534
(1987), and Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396, 397 (1985))).
170 . See Schiff, supra note 165.
171 . See id .
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nary tools of construction result in a narrow interpretation, would ask
whether such a construction would disable the law from accomplishing its
goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving air quality. A ju-
risprudential preference for a purpose-based background check does not
preordain broader statutory interpretations, and if done thoughtfully, does
not per se elevate a select group of legislators’ purposes.172
Courts should be cautious when adopting new background rules of stat-
utory interpretation—especially like the one proposed in this Note. There
may be concern that this rule would lead to uncertainty or a lack of warning
for regulated entities. But this should not be overstated. These actors could
still be protected by the presumption against retroactivity. And to the extent
that corporate managers may be held civilly liable, they are generally indem-
nified or insured by their employers.173 So, while some corporate managers
may still have to go through the psychic pain of defending themselves in
court, and while distortion of corporate action due to this fear may remain,
corporate law and practice already do much to minimize such distortions.174
The adoption of a new jurisprudential preference for a purpose “back-
ground check” on aging environmental statutes will ease judicial administra-
tion, reduce uncertainty for regulated parties, and, most importantly, pre-
serve the forward-looking goals of our most important environmental stat-
statutes.
CONCLUSION
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act has been a cornerstone of American con-
servation efforts for a century, but it is important to remember the lesson of
Geer. Sometimes a political or legal victory can become a barrier to long-
term, effective conservation efforts when extralegal factors shift around it.
The man-made physical and cultural structures that put pressure on bird
populations are very different today than they were in 1918. Today, what lies
on the other side of the balance opposite birds is not just economic prosperi-
ty and luxury fashion but a combination of interests that are both threaten-
ing and potentially life-saving for bird populations.
Aging is not the only similarity between the Act and other critical envi-
ronmental statutes. The study of climate change and its impact makes clear
that human activity has a mixed impact on the environment. This truth af-
172 . But cf . id . at 474–76. An accusation that intent and purpose analysis inappropriately
(and invariably) gives undue weight to the positions of individual members of Congress, rather
than the collective decision of Congress as a whole—embodied in the statute itself—is one of
the key arguments against this kind of analysis. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640–56 (1990).
173 . E .g ., Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1677, 1685–89 (2007).
174 . See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 115 (1985). See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strat-
egies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
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fected the development of the ESA even when it was relatively new, as seen
in Tennessee Valley Authority v . Hill in 1978.175 Are windmills that kill pro-
tected birds really that different from hydroelectric dams that kill protected
fish176 if both share the long-term purpose of sustainability? The mixed envi-
ronmental impact of human efforts to mitigate the long-term environmental
damage of climate change will continue to create immense pressure on key
statutes enacted without this tension in mind. Courts and conservationists
will have to get creative in crafting interpretations that stay within the legal
meaning of the statutes as enacted but also preserve fidelity to their critical
purposes.
The ongoing nature of the dispute over the Act illustrates that there is
great desire to conserve bird populations. More broadly, it suggests that
American conservationism is alive and well, despite recent political tid-
ings.177 The movement to continue to build off of more than a century of
American conservationism should be careful not to blunt one of its most
important tools into a bludgeon.
175. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
176 . Tenn . Valley Auth ., 437 U.S. 153. Of course, it should be noted that the dam in ques-
tion would have wiped out the only known population of the Snail Darter and not simply
killed individual members of the species. Id . at 161.
177. In addition to the Department of the Interior memorandum on incidental takings,
supra note 12, see Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Mon-
uments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-
ears.html?_r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“President Trump sharply reduced the
size of two national monuments in Utah on Monday by some two million acres, the largest
rollback of federal land protection in the nation’s history.”).
